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Genetics and Education:
The Ethics of Shaping Human Identity
VARDIT RAVITSKY, M.A.

Abstract
This paper suggests an analogy between education and genetic interventions as means of shaping the
identity of children and future adults. It proposes to look at issues discussed in the philosophy of education as a possible source of insight for ethical guidelines regarding future genetic interventions. The
paper focuses on situations of conflict between parents and state regarding the authority to determine
the child’s best interests. It describes the current formulation of the conflict in the literature as lacking
the crucial element of the child’s right to a cultural identity. It argues that this element is a necessary
component in an ethical analysis of the child’s best interests in a multicultural, liberal society which
respects diversity. The paper therefore proposes a better model for the moral evaluation of identityshaping decisions and offers some implications of this model for genetics.
Key Words: Identity, genetic interventions, behavioral genetics, children, education, culture, liberalism, autonomy, diversity.

Introduction
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, and the consequent efforts to understand the meaning of genetic information, are providing us with new choices regarding the
creation of new people. As in any other field of
human activity, greater choice means greater responsibility. Thus, each discovery regarding the genetic
basis of a disease, a trait or a behavior, raises ethical
concerns about the proper use of such information.
At present, prenatal genetic testing enables parents to have access to information about the genetic
makeup of their fetus. On the basis of this information, they may decide to terminate a pregnancy. Furthermore, pre-implantation genetic screening provides
potential parents who have chosen in vitro fertiliza-
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tion, with information about the various pre-embryos
and enables them to select the candidate they prefer
for implantation. In the future, it may become possible for parents to request direct genetic interventions
in a specific pre-embryo in order to add, extract or
modify pieces of DNA, with the aim of shaping the
identity of their future child. Such interventions,
when done not with the aim of diagnosing disease, but
rather with the aim of choosing a characteristic, raise
the ethical issue often referred to as the problem of
“designer babies.”
Much of the bioethical literature perceives the
idea of parents consciously and voluntarily shaping
the identity of their offspring by genetic interventions
as raising new ethical concerns. However, the case of
“designer babies” raises some very old ethical issues.
Human beings have been shaping the identity of children for centuries, by controlling the environment in
which children develop and, more directly, by educating them. I propose to think of education as the classical method of achieving the same goals that behavioral genetics will probably pursue through high-tech
interventions.
The “nature vs. nurture debate,” that famous competition between genetic and environmental explanations of human identity and behavior, has accompanied philosophical thought from its origins. From the
days of Plato (1), philosophers have been discussing
the proper way to shape the identity of future citizens,
© THE MOUNT SINAI JOURNALOF MEDICINE Vol. 69 No. 5 October 2002
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both in terms of genetic choice (i.e., choice of mate)
and in terms of education. New insight into the role
genes play in the shaping of human identity is not
likely to put an end to that debate. The ethical discussion should, however, relate to the process of identity
shaping as a continuous one. Any conscious, voluntary human intervention aimed at influencing that
process has important ethical dimensions, whether it
is genetic choice at the very beginning, or education at
later stages.
Genetic determinism, which is scientifically untenable as well as ethically dangerous, is not a necessary
assumption in such an ethical discussion. It is enough
to accept that there is a genetic component involved in
aspects of human identity such as intelligence, aggressiveness, assertiveness, submissiveness, sexual orientation, or the predisposition to addiction, to depression, or
to novelty seeking. All phenotypic expressions (physical, cognitive, mental or behavioral) are the result of a
complex interaction between genes, other biological
factors and the environment in which the individual develops. Even though, within that complex system, the
genetic factor is but one of many, there is still an important ethical dimension to any attempt to shape
human identity by controlling that one factor.
One may attack this proposed analogy between
education and genetic interventions by arguing that
identity shaping through education is permissible insofar as it is reversible, whereas identity shaping
through genetic interventions is irreversible and
should therefore be prohibited. However, education
and genetic interventions are both highly complex
ways of influencing the development of human identity. There is no reason to assume that one will have
more conclusive results than the other. Both are components in an intricate process that humans have always tried to influence or control.
The Question of Authority
Questions about the ethics of current and future
genetic interventions have an important political dimension, because they raise concerns about the authority to make decisions regarding the identity of future children. How should authority be delegated between parents or families on the one hand and the state
on the other, when the identity of children is at stake?
In this paper I propose to look at the question of authority as discussed in the philosophy of education, as
a possible source of ethical insight for the future regulation of genetic interventions. My discussion will
be limited to the context of the democratic liberal
state, in which public policy regarding these issues is
actually developing.
I will focus on situations of conflict between parents and state, around the question of the child’s best

313

interests. What ethical considerations are involved
when parents choose to educate their children in ways
that the liberal state believes to be harmful to them?
What is the scope of parental liberty? What justifies
state interference with parental choice? Some important implications of these questions of education, I
argue, are valid in the context of genetic choice as
well.
Liberal theory, following in the footsteps of
Locke (2), does not perceive children as the property
of their parents but rather as separate and independent
moral individuals. He states, “Thus we are born free
as we are born rational . . . age that brings one brings
with it the other, too. And thus we see how natural
freedom and subjection to parents may consist together. . . .” When parents do not act in their children’s best interests, the state in its traditional role of
parens patriae (parent of the nation) intervenes on behalf of the child. The scope of parental liberty is defined around the notion of the child’s best interests.
State intervention is perceived as legitimate and even
mandatory when risk of harm to the child is present or
probable.
Defining “best interests” or “harm” thus becomes
an important political issue of authority. Having the
power to determine the conditions of harm means having the power to justify state interference with the private sphere of parental autonomy. In the context of
multiculturalism, in a social reality of diversity, where
different cultures and value systems are competing,
the concept of harm may be understood in many different ways. The question of authority becomes,
therefore, central to the debate.
Autonomy-Based Liberalism
A classical liberal answer to the question of the
child’s best interests, rooted in Locke’s theory of education, is provided by the notion of “personal autonomy.” It says that growing up to become an autonomous adult is the child’s main best interest, so that
an education which does not promote autonomy is
harming the child. Raz (2) states it simply, when he
discusses the way liberal states should treat non-liberal cultures within them:
One particular troubling problem concerns
the treatment of communities whose culture
does not support autonomy. . . . Since they
insist on bringing up their children in their
own ways they are, in the eyes of liberals like
myself, harming them.
According to this view, if parents choose education which does not promote future autonomy, the
state has a moral obligation to intervene. Possible ex-
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amples are those of the education provided by the
Amish or the Jewish ultra-orthodox community. Children raised within these communities may find later in
life that they are unable to get into college or find employment outside of their communities.
In Raz’s terms, their autonomy is being diminished
rather than enhanced by their education, and the state
must intervene. He therefore adds: “Assimilationist
policies may well be the only humane course, even if
implemented by force of law.” “Autonomy-based liberalism” gives the state the authority to enforce the liberal majority’s view of the child’s best interest as developing into an autonomous adult, on minority cultures which hold different views. Such enforcement is
likely to result in the long run in the “break-up [of] their
communities, which is the inevitable by-product of the
destruction of their separate schools” (3).
Diversity-Based Liberalism
However, “autonomy-based liberalism,” and the
hierarchical conception of cultural diversity which accompanies it, is not the only possible version of liberalism. A different voice in the literature is that of “diversity-based liberalism,” according to which a serious respect for diversity requires that we accept the reality that personal autonomy is valued by certain cultures and not by others. According to this view, promoting autonomy over other, competing values constitutes a serious violation of people’s right to manage
their lives, and to educate their children, according to
their own beliefs. In Galston’s words (4):
[T]he decision to throw state power behind
the promotion of individual autonomy can
weaken or undermine individuals or groups
that do not and cannot organize their affairs in
accordance with that principle, without undermining the deepest sources of their identity.
Here again, the Jewish ultra-orthodox community
provides an excellent example. Making personal autonomy an educational goal will undermine the ability
of such a community to maintain its identity. Autonomy-derived ideals such as critical thinking or “being
the author of one’s own life-story” are not easily compatible with a culture based on the acceptance of religious authority. Therefore, in a multicultural society,
in Macedo’s words (5):
That the good life consists in autonomy is
properly regarded as one more sectarian view
among others, no more worthy of commanding public authority than other philosophical
and religious ideals of life that reasonable
people might reject.
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A liberal conception which is seriously committed
to the protection of diversity cannot take the future autonomy of the child as an absolute standard against
which all identity-shaping procedures are morally
evaluated. Therefore, it leaves the authority to make
identity-shaping decisions in the hands of parents and
communities. But does that mean that, other than
clear cases of physical abuse and neglect, there are no
limits to parental freedom? If personal autonomy is
not the standard against which harm is defined, what
other standard can the state hold?
Elliott (6) writes:
It is not uncommon these days for groups of
human beings with a particular biological
characteristic, often an illness or disability, to
identify themselves as a culture or a community. In the same way that we hear of Jewish
or Amish cultures . . . we now hear about
Deaf culture. . . . This makes the once-familiar lines between biology, identity and culture
look rather tangled.
Should parents be allowed to “choose for disability” (7) in the name of cultural compatibility? If one
accepts the Deaf culture argument, and considers the
Deaf community to be a valid source of cultural identity for its members (8), one should admit that the liberal state, as committed to the protection of cultural
diversity, must allow parents to make a genetic choice
that will ensure the birth of a deaf child, since they
themselves do not perceive such a choice as harming
that child. Does respect for diversity leave children
completely “defenseless” against their parents’ ideals
of the good life? How can we provide a full account
of the child’s best interests in a liberal multicultural
society which respects diversity while being committed to the protection of all children?
Identity Shaping and the Right to Culture
Following in the footsteps of Kymlicka (9), I
would like to argue that identity does not develop in a
vacuum. It is rather the result, among other things, of
a process of socialization which occurs within a specific cultural context. People have the right to belong
to a culture (10), the right to be embedded in the social context of a community, because only in such a
context can they give meaning and value to their lives,
and evaluate the different options available to them.
Cultures provide the environment within which individuals can make meaningful choices. Personal autonomy cannot be exercised outside a cultural context,
because in a moral and social vacuum the individual is
unable to ascribe meaning or to assess value.
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It is, therefore, misleading to think of the child as
having a deep interest in becoming autonomous, or in
having an “open future” (11), without giving enough
weight to the child’s interest in belonging to a culture.
And in order to be culturally embedded, a child must
go through a long and complex process of education
and socialization. In other words, for a child to exercise her right to a culture as an adult, her parents must
create a cultural context during her formative years.
Since children are born into families, they are also
born into given cultures, and a strong argument can be
made in favor of their right to become embedded in
those cultures. Other options involve either the removal of children from their organic families, and as
Gutmann comments (12): “liberals justifiably fear a
state so powerful that it could, as a matter of routine
practice, take all children away from their biological
parents,” or state intervention within the private
sphere of family life, which must be justified on
grounds of protecting the child from harm.
The Child’s Best Interests: A Balanced Model
The concept of the child’s best interest is of
paramount importance in the liberal model. The current formulation of the dilemma in the literature (7,
11, 13) confronts the child’s best interests, as perceived by the liberal majority, with the interests of
his parents and the community into which he has
been or will be born. However, according to this formulation a crucial element is missing from the picture. That element is the child’s interest in having a
cultural identity.
I would like to propose a better way of constructing the dilemma of identity-shaping, one which offers
a fuller and richer account of the child’s best interests:
not as a conflict between the child’s future autonomy
and the parents’current autonomy, but rather as a conflict between two different interests that the child herself has: one, in being socialized into a cultural context that will provide her, as an adult, with a cultural
identity and will give meaning and value to her life;
the other, in having an open future in the sense of “cultural mobility,” i.e., the ability to choose, as an adult,
to leave the culture she was socialized into, and join a
different one. An ethical analysis should look for a
sensible and sensitive balance between these two different interests, rather than ignore an important aspect
of the child’s identity-shaping process.
The model I would like to propose is one in which
the scope of the child’s right to a cultural identity is
determined by the ethical requirement of “cultural
mobility” or “conditions of exit.” Parents should
enjoy the liberty to determine the content and the aims
of children’s education, as well as the liberty to make
genetic choices that will shape the identity of their fu-
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ture children, as long as these choices do not create
adults who are “trapped” within their own cultures.
Galston (4) speaks of “rights of exit” from one’s
original culture, in the context of adulthood: “In circumstances of genuine pluralism, individual freedom
is adequately protected by secure rights of exit coupled with the existence of a wider society open to individuals wishing to leave their groups of origin.”
However, in the context of childhood “the classic
model of voluntary association” is inadequate. Galston is aware of the fact that “we are born into certain
groups to which we do not choose to belong.” A child
is generally incapable of leaving his group of origin,
but without certain basic capacities he also will not be
able to exercise his right of exit in the future.
Determining the minimal requirements for the future exercise of rights of exit becomes, therefore, the
key to a properly balanced model for the protection of
children’s best interests. Galston mentions four necessary conditions which would make the adult’s right
of exit a meaningful one. To meet these conditions of
exit, the process of identity-shaping must provide: (a)
basic knowledge about the existence and content of
other cultures; (b) the ability to evaluate other cultures
and compare them to one’s own; (c) basic abilities
which make it possible to effectively become integrated into another culture; and (d) protection from
physical or psychological coercion to remain a part of
the community in the future. Each of these conditions
should be grounded in adequate genetic choice, in
proper education, and in a properly balanced process
of enculturation.
Implications for Genetics
The implications for genetic choice are clear in
the case of “choosing for disability.” Just as parents
should not be allowed to intentionally raise illiterate
children who will not be able to become effectively integrated in other cultures, so they should not have the
liberty to make genetic choices which will result in
children with limited physical or cognitive abilities.
Any choice that will obviously trap the future individual in her community of origin is thus impermissible.
In the context of behavioral genetics, however,
the implications are more complicated. As noted earlier, future discoveries of genes which underlie not
disease and disability, but rather normal variation in
human behavior and personality traits, may induce
parents’ attempts to increase the level of control they
have over the genetic makeup of their offspring.
Parents’ wishes to genetically reinforce a certain
personality trait or behavioral predisposition, in order
to enhance the cultural compatibility of their child
with the community in which she will live or with a
certain set of beliefs that they hold, should be evalu-
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ated through the ethical lens of future cultural mobility. State interference is justified when genetic choice
is not in the child’s best interest, as determined by balancing her right to her own culture against her right to
future cultural mobility.
If, for example, parents choose a genetic intervention aimed at the enhancement of aggressive behavior because they live in a warrior culture such as
the fictitious Klingon culture (as depicted in “Star
Trek — the Next Generation”), their choice will be
ethically impermissible if as a result of it the child will
never be able to successfully become integrated in a
non-warrior, peace-loving culture.
Other parents, living in a patriarchal society, may
wish to genetically enhance their future daughter’s
predisposition to submissiveness, in order to improve
her chances for a “good marriage.” In their own eyes,
they will be acting in her best interests. However,
conditions of exit require that such an intervention
will not result in a woman who is submissive to the
point of being unable, as an adult, to choose life in a
culture based on gender equality.
Conclusion
This paper analyzed the concept of the child’s
best interests in the context of the liberal multicultural
state. It argued for a model of evaluation in which the
ethical consideration of the child’s future autonomy is
balanced against considerations regarding her future
cultural identity, so that future cultural mobility is protected. It then offered some general guidelines for
“conditions of exit” from one’s culture of origin.
This proposed model for the ethical evaluation of
education has important implications for the evaluation of future genetic interventions which aim to shape
aspects of children’s identities in order to enhance
their compatibility with their parents’ community and
culture. As in the context of education, parental freedom to use genetic interventions should be restricted
by the state if, as a result of it, the child will be unable,
as a future adult, to leave his culture of origin and become effectively integrated in the culture of his

choice. The proposed model thus offers a tool for the
ethical evaluation of future genetic choices ranging
from physical characteristics to behavioral predispositions and personality traits.
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